AN ACT CONCERNING FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS

A Committee Bill is pending that may affect Connecticut family law practitioners, and our clients:

General Assembly

Committee Bill No. 5505

January Session, 2015

LCO No. 4691
*04691HB05505JUD*
Referred to Committee on JUDICIARY
Introduced by:
(JUD)

AN ACT CONCERNING FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 815, 815a, 815e, 815j, 815p, 815t or 815y of the general statutes, a court shall not order that a parent have supervised visitation with his or her child, unless such court finds, based upon the evidence presented to the court, that such parent: (1) Has engaged in an act of neglect or abuse that has been substantiated by the Department of Children and Families; (2) has no established relationship with the child with whom visitation is sought; (3) has engaged in criminal conduct that presents a potential risk to the health, safety or well-being of a child; or (4) suffers from a severe mental disability that presents a potential risk to the health, safety or well-being of a child.

Sec. 2. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) A person aggrieved by the action of counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child or children, appointed under section 46b-54 of the general statutes, as amended by this act, may bring a civil action seeking appropriate relief, including equitable relief, damages, or both, in the superior court for the judicial district in which such counsel or guardian ad litem for a minor child was appointed. If such civil action results in a judgment for the plaintiff, the court shall award the plaintiff all costs of the action, including such attorney’s fees as the court may allow to the plaintiff. The court shall not enter any order under this section that would require a plaintiff to pay the costs, expenses or attorney’s fees of counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child named as a defendant in such civil action. It shall not be a defense to such civil action that the defendant is entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity.

Sec. 3. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) (a) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a parent undergo treatment or an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the court shall allow the parent to select the licensed health care provider who is to provide such treatment or evaluation.

(b) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a child undergo treatment or an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the court shall permit the parent or legal guardian of such child to select the licensed health care provider who is to provide such treatment or evaluation. If two parents do not agree on the selection of a licensed health care provider to provide such treatment or evaluation to a child, the court shall continue the matter for two weeks to allow the parents an opportunity to jointly select the licensed health care provider. If after the two-week period, the parents have not reached an agreement on the selection of a licensed health care provider, the court shall select such provider after giving due consideration to the health insurance coverage and financial resources available to such parents. In the case of two parents who cannot agree on the selection of a licensed health care provider to provide such treatment or evaluation to the child, if a parent incurs expenses as a result of permitting the child to be treated or evaluated by such provider, without the express written consent of the other parent, the parent who permitted such treatment or evaluation to occur shall be solely responsible for the costs incurred for such treatment or evaluation.

(c) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a parent or child undergo an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the results of such evaluation shall be submitted to the court by such provider not later than thirty days after the date of completion of the evaluation.

Sec. 4. Subsection (e) of section 46b-54 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2015):

(e) [Counsel] Except as provided in this subsection, counsel or a guardian ad litem for the minor child or children shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of the child, so long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the child. To the extent practicable, when hearing from such counsel or guardian ad litem, the court shall permit such counsel or guardian ad litem to participate at the beginning of the matter, at the conclusion of the matter or at such other time the court deems appropriate so as to minimize legal fees incurred by the parties due to the participation of such counsel or guardian ad litem in the matter. Such counsel or guardian ad litem [may] shall not be heard on a matter pertaining to a medical diagnosis or conclusion concerning a minor child made by a health care professional treating such child. [when (1) such counsel or guardian ad litem is in possession of a medical record or report of the treating health care professional that indicates or supports such medical diagnosis or conclusion; or (2) one or more parties have refused to cooperate in paying for or obtaining a medical record or report that contains the treating health care professional’s medical diagnosis or conclusion. If] Instead, if the court deems it to be in the best interests of the minor child, such health care professional shall be heard on matters pertaining to the interests of any such child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of such child.

This act shall take effect as follows and shall amend the following sections:
Section 1 October 1, 2015 New section
Sec. 2 October 1, 2015 New section
Sec. 3 October 1, 2015 New section
Sec. 4 October 1, 2015 46b-54(e)

Statement of Purpose:

To implement reforms in family court proceedings.

[Proposed deletions are enclosed in brackets. Proposed additions are indicated by underline, except that when the entire text of a bill or resolution or a section of a bill or resolution is new, it is not underlined.]

Co-Sponsors: REP. GONZALEZ, 3rd Dist.; REP. FRITZ, 90th Dist.

H.B. 5505

Does a party to a divorce need to disclose an accrued, but unvested pension?

Does a party to a divorce need to disclose an accrued, but unvested pension?

In Connecticut parties to a divorce need to exchange Financial Affidavits. These affidavits are designed to provide a comprehensive picture of income, living expenses, assets, and liabilities. A party to a divorce is entitled to rely on the representations of an opposing-party’s Financial Affidavit.

What happens when a party to a divorce does not disclose an accrued, but unvested pension on his or her Financial Affidavit? If a party can argue that an asset was not appropriately disclosed, they may try to re-open a divorce judgment, as it relates to property distribution.

The Connecticut Supreme Court, in the case of Catherine Reville vs. John Reville (SC 18452) (officially released July 8, 2014) addresses the issue. As stated in this decision:

• A party is legally obligated to disclose the existence and characteristics of a pension regardless of whether it clearly is distributable property (under Connecticut General Statute Section 46b-81).

• A party’s ability to show she was defrauded, is not dependent on her establishing that had she known about the pension, she would have been awarded some portion of it.

The real issue in the Reville case is disclosure, as opposed to the right to a party’s interest in the pension, which is addressed in an earlier case . See Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 751
The Supreme Court commented that the existence of the pension “was a highly relevant consideration both for the plaintiff in deciding whether to agree to the proposed settlement agreement, and for the dissolution court in deciding whether to approve that agreement.” “Accordingly, nondisclosure, if proven, could have caused the plaintiff to act to her detriment, and full disclosure could have led to a different result in the dissolution action.”

The Court reiterated that “all retirement and employment benefits potentially receivable by a party to a dissolution action must be fully and frankly disclosed on that party’s financial affidavits, regardless of whether they are definitively established to be distributable marital property.”

Joel A. DeFelice is a partner at Marder & DeFelice Law Offices, LLC, located in Vernon, Connecticut.

Transferring Real Estate in a Divorce

Billy Joel told us that Brenda and Eddie “were the popular steadies and the king and the queen of the prom”. But as the song goes, “[t]hey got a divorce as a matter of course, and they parted the closest of friends.”

How should parties divide jointly owned real estate, especially jointly owned real estate encumbered by a mortgage (usually in both names), in a divorce?

One important consideration is that the party who keeps the home, should be required to make efforts to refinance or assume the existing mortgage, so as to release the other of liability on the mortgage debt.

The timeline for this requirement will vary depending on the circumstances. Dividing real estate in a divorce is just one part of the ‘mosaic’ of a property settlement. For example the party keeping the home, might be given several years to re-finance, so as to give the children stability until they reach a certain age.

What if the party who keeps the home doesn’t refinance within the time permitted (i.e. according to the agreement / judgment)?

The party who was obligated to refinance the home, may be subject to 1) a finding of contempt of court (resulting in sanctions), or 2) the court might order that the home be sold.

However, in Connecticut, the statute that governs “assignment of property” states:

At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage… the Superior Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse. …” (See C.G.S. 46b-81(a)) (Emphasis added.)

This means a Court may not order the home be sold before, or after, the divorce judgment, but only at the time of the divorce judgment. Therefore, some circumstances may justify asking the Court, at the time of entering judgment, to “reserve jurisdiction” over disposition of the home, after the judgment. Many things can be done by agreement of the divorcing parties, that the law otherwise doesn’t allow for.

Speak with an experienced attorney about this issue. Despite Brenda and Eddie “departing the closest of friends”, neither wants to be tied up on a mortgage, for the next thirty years.

Joel A. DeFelice is a partner at Marder & DeFelice Law Offices, LLC, located in Vernon, Connecticut.